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Under the Equal Pay Act of 1963,1 employers are prohibited
from paying men and women different amounts for identical work
if the only justification for the differential is sex. Similarly, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 prohibits other forms of dis-
crimination against women. For example, employers (with certain
narrow exceptions) cannot lawfully refuse to hire women for par-
ticular jobs. But an employer in a particular business who treats
men and women equally in all respects does not violate either the
Equal Pay Act or Title VII. Thus, an employer of nurses who pays
female and male nurses the same amount and stands willing to
hire both cannot be sued under current anti-discrimination laws.
Because such an employer has not discriminated between male and
female nurses, he has not acted illegally.
The employer could be liable, however, under the theory of
comparable worth. This theory is based on the premise that jobs of
equivalent "worth" or value to an employer or to society as a whole
should be compensated equally even if the jobs are dissimilar in
content. The theory assumes that the proper remedy when two
jobs are "comparable," but unequally compensated, is for the em-
ployer of the lower-paying job to raise employees' compensation to
the level of the higher-paying job. Thus, the employer of nurses
who did not discriminate between male and female nurses could
nevertheless be liable under a theory of comparable worth if a
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plaintiff could demonstrate that nurses possessed skills comparable
to, say, electricians, but were paid less. The employer would then
be required to raise the compensation of nurses to the level of
electricians.
Claims brought under Title VII that are explicitly premised on
a theory of comparable worth have become much more common in
recent years. So far, no court has directly endorsed the theory and
several have rejected it outright.' The Supreme Court in County of
Washington v. Gunther,4 however, suggested that occupational
wage differentials may be actionable under Title VII in certain cir-
cumstances. Although the Court expressly refused to address the
theory of comparable worth,5 many commentators have interpreted
the decision as a significant expansion of Title VII. Whatever the
state of comparable worth in the courts, the issue remains very im-
portant. Numerous states and local governments have enacted, or
are currently considering, comparable worth legislation for govern-
ment employees.7 The same is true of foreign countries.8
Comparable worth has been strongly defended as a necessary
extension of existing anti-discrimination legislation.9 Proponents
note that women typically earn only sixty cents for every dollar
3 See American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); American Fed'n
of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.
1985).
4 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
5 Id. at 166, 181.
6 See, e.g., Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEo. L.J. 1123,
1134-36 (1981); Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal"-Job Segregation and Pay Eq-
uity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 269, 272-85; Vieira, Comparable Worth
and the Gunther Case: The New Drive for Equal Pay, 18 U.C.D. L. REv. 449 (1985).
7 See, e.g., BUREAU OF NATiONAL AFFARs (BNA), PAY EQurrY AND COMPARABLE WORTH
55-68 (1984) (listing existing and proposed state pay equity legislation); Rothchild, Overview
of Pay Initiatives, 1974-1984, in 1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 119, 121-23, 128
(U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 1984) (listing state legislation and local initiatives) [hereinaf-
ter cited as IsSUE FOR THE 80'S].
8 See, e.g., Bellace, A Foreign Perspective, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTER-
NATIVES 137 (E. Livernash ed., 2d ed. 1984) (analyzing the experiences of the European
Community, Sweden, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in trying to achieve "pay eq-
uity"); Gasaway, supra note 6, at 1149-55 (discussing comparable worth abroad).
' See, e.g., Beller, Occupational Segregation and the Earnings Gap, in IssUE FOR THE
80's, supra note 7, at 25-26 (discussing force of Title VII in eliminating occupational segre-
gation); Bergman, The Economic Case for Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH: NEW
DIrmCTIONs FOR RESEARCH 71 (H. Hartmann ed. 1985) (offering economic arguments for
comparable worth) [hereinafter cited as NEw DIRECTIONS]; Blumrosen, Wage Discrimina-
tion, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
397, 490-502 (1979) (arguing that comparable worth is available under Title VII as a remedy
for wage discrimination).
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earned by men'0 and this ratio has not changed appreciably over
time, notwithstanding the passage of anti-discrimination legisla-
tion.1' Moreover, a high percentage of women in the labor force
still tend to be concentrated in a relatively small number of low-
paying occupations.1 2 Traditional anti-discrimination legislation,
proponents claim, is ineffective in remedying this systemic, econ-
omy-wide discrimination under which women are segregated into a
limited number of low-paying occupations. Only a remedy such as
comparable worth which attacks discrimination at the occupational
level rather than at the job level, it is argued, can effectively com-
bat this systemic discrimination.
Comparable worth has also attracted its share of critics.' 3 The
most frequent objection to comparable worth has focused on the
premise that the comparability of different jobs can be measured
or evaluated apart from values assigned in the marketplace. 14 Crit-
ics claim that the "worth" of a job can only be determined by ref-
1o See Women in the Work Force: Pay Equity, Hearing before the Joint Economic
Committee, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984) (statement of Heidi Hartmann) ("It is well-known
that on average the earnings of women who are employed full-time are approximately 60
percent of those of men who are also employed full-time.") [hereinafter cited as Hearing];
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR Jos OF EQUAL VALUE 41 (D. Treiman & H.
Hartmann eds. 1981) (among full-time, year-round workers, earnings of women average less
than 60% of those of men) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK & WAGES].
" See, e.g., WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 6 (Table 1) (1979) (figures show a persistent earn-
ings gap over a two decade period) [hereinafter cited as EARNINGS GAP]; Hearing, supra note
10, at 4 (statement of Heidi Hartmann) ("It is ... well-established that sex segregation in
the labor market is extreme and has not changed much since 1900."); Blumrosen, supra
note 9, at 411 ("After almost fifteen years of federal legislation prohibiting discrimination in
compensation and segregation of jobs, the wage gap is larger now than it was before the
legislation."); O'Neill, The Trend in the Male-Female Wage Gap in the United States, 3 J.
LAB. ECON. S91, S93 (1985) (the female-to-male earnings ratio based on the annual earnings
of year-round full time workers was 58% in 1939, 64% in the middle 1950's, 58% again in
the mid-1960's, and 62% in 1982). O'Neill predicts that the increasing work experience of
women in recent years and other factors will lead to a narrowing of the wage gap in the next
10 years. Id.
'2 See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 10, at 24-41; Blumrosen, supra note 9, at
415.
1 See, e.g., Killingsworth, The Economics of Comparable Worth: Analytical, Empiri-
cal, and Policy Questions, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 86; Lindsay & Shanor,
County of Washington v. Gunther: Economic and Legal Considerations for Resolving Sex-
Based Wage Discrimination Cases, 1 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 185 (1982); O'Neill, An Argument
Against Comparable Worth, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra note 7, at 177; RITA RICARDO-
CAMPBELL, WOMEN AND COMPARABLE WORTH (Hoover Inst. Monograph Series 1985).
11 See, e.g., O'Neill, supra note 13, at 178 ("In a free market, wages and prices are not
taken as judgments of the inherent value of the worker or the good itself, but reflect a
balancing of what people are willing to pay for the services of these goods with how much it
costs to supply them.. . . There is simply no independent scientific way to determine what
pay should be in a particular occupation without recourse to the market.").
1986]
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erence to the wage that prevails in the market as a result of the
forces of supply and demand. Thus, the critics argue, it is a funda-
mental contradiction to argue that jobs that are valued differently
in the market are nevertheless comparable. The debate about com-
parable worth, in this view, is simply a modern manifestation of
the question that has confounded philosophers for centuries con-
cerning the meaning of a "just" price or wage.
While this standard market critique of comparable worth is
powerful, it is not compelling. Many situations exist where market
prices are not accepted as final. In antitrust cases, for example, a
common inquiry is whether prices charged to consumers are too
high as a result of the exercise of market power. Similarly, in cases
under the Equal Pay Act, the effect of alleged discrimination on
wages paid to men and women is critical. Unless one is willing to
argue that the market price should be accepted as dispositive in
these other contexts, the standard market critique of comparable
worth is not entirely convincing.
We provide a critique of comparable worth that does not de-
pend on acceptance of the market price as dispositive. On the con-
trary, we freely concede for purposes of argument that observed
wage differentials among occupations may, at least in theory, re-
flect discrimination against women. While we discuss some of the
explanations for the wage differentials between men and
women-specifically the "crowding" and "choice" hypotheses-we
do not attempt to discover the cause of the differentials here.
Rather, we argue that comparable worth is never the correct rem-
edy, even if wage differentials and job segregation are the product
of discrimination against women.
The essence of our argument is as follows. Assume that women
are discriminated against and wrongfully denied entry into a male-
dominated occupation, say, electronics. Women prevented from be-
coming electricians will flood other occupations such as nursing.
The increased supply of women in nursing and other female-
dominated occupations may well have the effect of depressing
wages. The proper solution, however, is not to raise the wage of
nurses while doing nothing about barriers to entry in electronics.
Such a remedy would merely combat one inefficiency in the econ-
omy (barriers to entry in electronics) by creating a second ineffi-
ciency (a minimum wage in nursing). Yet this is precisely the effect
of comparable worth.
We then discuss the moral argument that comparable worth is
compelled by the need for pay equity for women. We argue that
the attempt to justify comparable worth on moral grounds only
[53:891
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serves to obscure the effects of comparable worth on various
groups. In fact, many women may be hurt by comparable worth. If
a consensus exists that women should be compensated for the ef-
fects of past discrimination, such compensation should be in the
form of a direct public subsidy rather than comparable worth.
Finally, we assess the argument that comparable worth is sim-
ply an extension of existing anti-discrimination legislation. Be-
cause comparable worth imposes a minimum wage but does noth-
ing about discrimination in the economy, we argue that it is
fundamentally inconsistent with, rather than an extension of, ex-
isting anti-discrimination legislation. In practice, however, existing
anti-discrimination legislation may have the same perverse effects
as comparable worth. But even if we assume that Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act are beneficial, they still provide no support for com-
parable worth.
We conclude the article with a discussion of the implications
of our analysis for comparable worth cases in the courts and for
the Gunther case. We argue that Gunther provides no support for
the theory of comparable worth and is probably wrongly decided
on its own facts.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS
Full-time working women earn approximately sixty percent of
what full-time working men earn.15 Much if not all of this differen-
tial is attributable to the disproportionate concentration of women
in lower-paying occupations rather than men and women being
paid differently for identical work.' 6 This much is uncontroversial.
The hard question, however, is why women are found in lower pay-
ing occupations. We show in this section how wage differentials
may or may not reflect discrimination against women. We also
demonstrate the deficiencies of job evaluation studies which are
frequently performed to analyze whether wage differentials among
occupations are a product of discrimination against women.
"' See sources cited supra note 10.
" See, e.g., EARNINGS GAP, supra note 11, at 2 ("Of prime importance ... in explain-
ing the earnings differential is the concentration of women in relatively low-paying occupa-
tions and lower status jobs even within the higher paying occupation groups."); Newman &
Vonhof, supra note 6, at 270 ("the current disparity is not primarily due to unequal pay for
equal work . . . but rather to the concentration of women in low-paying jobs which are
different in content from men's jobs") (footnote omitted); Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Dif-
ferentials in Urban Labor Markets, 14 INr'L ECON. REV. 693, 708 (1973) (same).
1986]
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A. Wage Differentials and Discrimination
Wage differentials among occupations are the norm rather
than the exception. Successful athletes and entertainers commonly
earn more than Nobel Prize winners; brilliant artists often cannot
earn enough to survive while mediocre investment bankers flour-
ish. Within the academic community, law professors generally re-
ceive higher salaries (even ignoring consulting opportunities) than
professors of-political science, even though the skills required for
both are quite similar. The examples could be multiplied
indefinitely.
Why does anyone choose a lower paid occupation such as po-
litical science over a higher paid one such as law? Assuming that
individuals are free to choose, the answer must be that they prefer
political science (at least at the time the decision is made) even at
a lower wage. Perhaps they view the prospect of law school as ab-
horrent; perhaps they view legal research as dull; perhaps they
view lawyers as social parasites or buffoons; perhaps they think law
students are more demanding and decide that it would be more
enjoyable to teach political science. Whatever the reason, it must
be true that individuals who are free to choose law, but voluntarily
choose to enter the lower-paying occupation of political science,
cannot be worse off. We refer to this scenario as the "choice" ex-
planation for wage differentials.
Now suppose that certain individuals are arbitrarily precluded
from entering law. Political science might then be flooded with in-
dividuals who would otherwise prefer to teach law, but are crowded
out by the entry barrier. Because of the increased supply of indi-
viduals going into political science, wages in this area will be artifi-
cially low while wages in law will be artificially high. Those willing
to work in the lower-paying area of political science may only be
willing to do so because they are denied the opportunity to teach
law by the entry barrier. 17 We refer to this scenario as the "crowd-
ing" explanation for wage differentials. 8
This simple example of how both the choice and the crowding
explanations can explain wage differentials between two occupa-
tions when sex is not an issue is illustrative of the ambiguity of
17 In all probability, entry barriers would have to be pervasive for there to be a de-
pressing effect on wages for political scientists. For purposes of analysis, we assume that all
barriers to entry in one occupation depress wages in other occupations.
'8 The crowding explanation for wage differentials in the context of racial discrimina-
tion is articulated and formalized in Bergmann, The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimi-
nation in Employment, 79 J. POL. ECON. 294, 299-301 (1971).
[53:891
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statistical disparities in wages when sex is an issue. Women may
choose lower-paying occupations because of certain attributes of
those occupations; alternatively, they may choose lower-paying oc-
cupations because they are denied entry into other higher-paying
occupations.
Why might women voluntarily choose lower-paying occupa-
tions? One explanation is that many women choose to specialize in
child bearing and raising as well as in the production of household
services. If women specialize in this manner (while men specialize
in the production of income), they may select careers where they
are free to enter and leave the workforce with minimum penalty.
They may choose to acquire skills that do not depreciate rapidly
with temporary absences from the workforce. Conversely, they may
avoid occupations (or specialties within occupations) which require
long training periods, long and unpredictable hours, willingness to
relocate, and other attributes which are inconsistent with speciali-
zation in child care and other household responsibilities. Finally,
women may expend less effort for any given number of working
hours because of their child care and household responsibilities."9
By choosing to invest less in developing the value of their human
capital and to expend less effort, however, women must pay a price
in the form of lower wages. But women are not the victims of dis-
crimination under this scenario because they prefer the lower-
paying occupations or sub-occupations over higher-paying ones
that make production of household services (including child bear-
ing and raising) more difficult.
The alternative explanation for wage differentials is that
women do not voluntarily choose lower-paying occupations but,
rather, are forced into those occupations by discriminating employ-
ers and social prejudices. If employers in certain occupations have
a taste for discrimination, they may refuse to hire qualified
women. 20 More generally, subtle society-wide prejudices may in-
duce women to avoid certain occupations in favor of others that
are perceived as more suitable for women. Indeed, the "choice" of
" G. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON.
S33 (1985).
20 See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-50 (2d ed. 1971)
(discussing effect of employers' discrimination on labor markets). Alternatively, employers
with a taste for discrimination may hire women but pay them less than men. Other groups
such as unions or consumers may also have a taste for discrimination. Unions may refuse to
admit women to membership; consumers may refuse to patronize firms which do not dis-
criminate against women. Such actions by unions or consumers may create entry barriers to
women even if employers do not have a taste for discrimination.
1986]
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women to specialize in child bearing and raising and the produc-
tion of household services may itself result from discrimination at
the societal level. If this societal discrimination did not exist,
women's choices might also be different.21 Whether the discrimina-
tion is by employers in a particular occupation or by society as a
whole is irrelevant; the effect will be the same. Women crowded
out of certain occupations will flood others and this increase in
supply will have a depressing effect on wages in occupations domi-
nated by women. We take up the notion of societal discrimination
again in section C of part III.
B. The Empirical Evidence
On a theoretical level, it is impossible to decide whether the
choice or the crowding explanation better explains wage differen-
tials. The issue is necessarily empirical. Unfortunately, it is ex-
tremely difficult to disentangle, even empirically, the sources of the
wage differential.
The basic problem is that there is no direct measure for what
we would like to test-the causal effect of discrimination on wage
differentials. As a result, economists have attempted to measure
the effect of discrimination on wages indirectly by measuring how
much of the wage differential between men and women can be ex-
plained by such factors as education, work experience, seniority,
number of hours worked, continuity within the workforce, and so
forth. Numerous studies have been performed along these lines.22
Their general conclusion is that less than half of the wage differen-
tial can be explained by taking all these factors into account.23
Many have interpreted this large unexplained residual as estab-
lishing, or at least creating a presumption, that discrimination
against women has had a depressing effect on wages in female-
dominated occupations.24
21 See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 54 U. CH. L. REv. (forth-
coming) (discussing adaptive preferences).
22 For a concise summary of these studies, see WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 10,
at 13-42.
22 See, e.g., id. at 42 (attempts to explain differentials on the basis of such factors as
education, labor force experience, labor force commitment, or other human capital factors
"usually account for less than a quarter and never more than half of the observed earnings
differences"); Blinder, Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates, 8 J.
HUMAN RESOURCES 436, 449 (1973) (two-thirds of male-female wage differential attributable
to outright discrimination in labor markets).
24 See, e.g., WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 10, at 24 ("[R]esearchers have consist-
ently found that a substantial part of the earnings difference cannot be explained by factors
thought to measure productivity differences. Taken at face value, these results create a pre-
[53:891
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Others, however, have questioned this interpretation of the
data for several reasons.2 5 First, the existence of an unexplained
residual does not directly establish discrimination. The residual
may instead be due to some other factor that is not being tested.
Second, when the data is analyzed more carefully, certain basic in-
consistencies arise between the data and the crowding hypothesis.
The crowding hypothesis would predict, for example; that the wage
differential between men and women will not be a function of the
marital status of either group. In fact, however, marital status and
other family characteristics are crucial.28
Women who have never been married appear to have complete
wage parity with men who have never been married. Conversely,
women who are currently married earn less than half of what men
who are currently married earn. Family size is also relevant. The
larger the number of children, and the greater the spacing between
children, the larger the wage differential. Age matters as well.
Earnings differentials are the smallest in the early years, then in-
crease until about age 40, and then decline again.27
Each of these statistics is consistent with the choice theory of
wage differentials (where women specialize in child bearing and
other household services), but inconsistent with the crowding the-
ory. However, the failure of the choice hypothesis to explain much
of the wage differential-even when as many factors as possible are
held constant-cautions against its easy acceptance. Given the cur-
rent state of learning, the causes of wage differentials remain
something of a mystery.
sumption of additional factors at work, possibly including institutional barriers and discrim-
ination."); Oaxaca, Theory and Measurement of the Economics of Discrimination, in EQUAL
RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 25 (L. Hausman, 0. Ashenfelter, B. Rustin, R. Schubert
& D. Slaiman eds. 1977) (discrimination accounts for between 58 and 75% of the gross wage
differential).
25 See, e.g., E. Landes, Sex-Differences in Wages and Employment: A Test of the Spe-
cific Capital Hypothesis, 15 ECON. INQUIRY 523, 523 (1977) (at least two-thirds of wage dif-
ferential between men and women within occupations is accounted for by nondiscriminatory
employment practices); Lindsay & Shanor, supra note 13, at 217-21 (wage differentials
could be explained by factors other than discrimination if the data were suitably refined);
O'Neill, supra note 13, at 183 ("the true effect of sex on occupational differences or wage
rates is [an] unresolved issue"); Polachek, Women in the Economy: Perspectives on Gender
Inequality, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra note 7, at 45 (human capital model explains nearly
100% of the wage differential); Roberts, Statistical Biases in the Measurement of Employ-
ment Discrimination, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at
173-95 (inference of discrimination is largely a function of biases in statistical
methodologies).
2" See Polachek, supra note 25, at 40-43.
2 Id. at 40.
1986]
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C. Job Evaluation Studies
The above analysis suggests that wage differentials among oc-
cupations are not a subject of concern unless there has been a bar-
rier to entry which makes free choice impossible. Plaintiffs in com-
parable worth cases, however, have not established the existence of
such barriers. Rather, they have introduced job evaluation studies
which purport to demonstrate that certain occupations such as
nursing are "comparable" in "worth" to others such as electronics
but are paid less.
Such studies of "worth" in labor markets, however, are inher-
ently unreliable. To illustrate this point, it is useful to consider an
example drawn from product markets. Consider a hypothetical
survey to determine whether water has a value comparable to
diamonds. The individual who is conducting the study can resolve
this question easily by reference to the market price of water (very
low) and diamonds (very high). Of course, this would eliminate the
need for the survey in the first place.
But now assume that market prices are discarded because they
are somehow biased. What should the author of the study do now?
A natural conclusion in the absence of market prices is that since
water is necessary for life and diamonds are not, water should rise
in price relative to diamonds.
Such a conclusion would, however, overlook the importance of
marginal values and thus be a serious error. Water is cheap be-
cause of its relative abundance. The first units of water are neces-
sary for life and thus are surely worth more than diamonds. But
more water exists than is necessary to support life. Thus, each ad-
ditional unit of water is worth less than the first and the last mar-
ginal units can be used for such nonessential activities as swim-
ming. Raising the price of water to its intrinsic (average) value
would preclude its use for swimming even if an ample supply exists
for this purpose.
The value of diamonds presents other problems. True,
diamonds are scarce, but not as scarce as, say, a painting by one of
the authors of this paper. If the author of a "beauty" survey con-
cluded (by some miracle) that our painting was as beautiful as a
diamond but more scarce, should our painting sell for more?
Equally intractable problems arise in value studies of labor
markets. The criteria for measuring "worth"-e.g., for measuring
whether successful athletes are worth more than Nobel Prize win-
ners-are completely subjective and lack any benchmark apart
[53:891
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from market price.28 Moreover, the meaning of "worth" or "value"
is not well specified. The value produced by the first worker, the
average worker, and the last worker hired by an employer are all
different and are likely to differ further across occupations. Which
value counts and how is it to be measured apart from employers'
willingness to pay? These problems and others doom, for all prac-
tical purposes, using job evaluation studies to establish discrimina-
tion, particularly where no showing has been made of any barrier
to entry into higher-paying occupations.2"
III. THE PROPER REMEDY
Any persistent wage differential among occupations must ei-
ther be non-discriminatory (i.e., compensation for attractiveness of
work or some other legitimate factor) or must reflect a barrier to
entry in higher-paying occupations.3 0 In the former situation, the
proper course is to do nothing. Eliminating non-discriminatory
wage differentials would create misallocations similar to those that
would arise if the' price differential between water and diamonds
were eliminated. For purposes of analysis, we ignore the choice hy-
pothesis in the remainder of this section and assume that occupa-
tional wage differentials reflect a barrier to entry. We demonstrate
"s The Ninth Circuit's discussion of the job evaluation study in AFSCME v. Washing-
ton, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), illustrates the pervasive subjectivity inherent in such
studies:
Comparable worth was calculated by evaluating jobs under four criteria: knowledge and
skills, mental demands, accountability, and working conditions. A maximum number of
points was allotted to each category: 280 for knowledge and skills, 140 for mental de-
mands, 160 for accountability and 20 for working conditions. Every job was assigned a
numerical value under each of the four criteria.
Id. at 1403. The study found a wage disparity of about 20% between jobs held predomi-
nantly by women and jobs held predominantly by men. Id.
The arbitrariness of such a study is obvious. Why are there four as opposed to three or
ten categories that count? Why does each category have the weight that it does? How are
points assigned to different occupations? Who decides all these questions? What would be
the result of application of these four criteria to wage differentials between law and political
science professors?
" Another problem with using occupational job evaluation studies to establish discrim-
ination is that such studies focus on inter-occupational wage differentials and ignore intra-
occupational differences. As a result, they may conclude that discrimination exists when
none is present. For example, if wages in male-dominated occupations are higher than wages
in "comparable" female-dominated occupations but females in each occupation are paid
more than males, the studies would wrongly predict that women were being subjected to
discrimination. Alternatively, occupational job evaluation studies may fail to recognize dis-
crimination when it exists if it averages out across occupations.
30 If wage differentials were not compensating, and if there were no barriers to entry,
all workers would leave the low-paying job for the higher-paying one. This would result in
either the equalization of wages or in the complete extinction of the low-paying occupation.
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that, even in this situation, comparable worth is the wrong remedy.
A. Labor Market Distortions and the Crowding Hypothesis
The crowding hypothesis assumes that wages are set by the
forces of supply and demand but that women are precluded from
entering certain occupations. The spillover of women from the re-
stricted to the unrestricted occupation forces wages up in the for-
mer and down in the latter. The restricted occupation becomes
male dominated and the unrestricted occupation becomes female























Panel A shows supply and demand in the unrestricted occupation
which ends up being female dominated and Panel B shows supply
and demand in the restricted occupation which ends up being male
dominated. Without any restrictions on entry into occupation B,
the wage would be WM* and the quantity employed would be M*.
Barriers restricting women from entering occupation B reduce the
effective supply of workers from S* to S, driving the wage up to
WM and the quantity employed down to M. The restriction on
[53:891
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employment also forces women into occupation A, shifting the sup-
ply curve from S*, where it would be in the absence of mobility
restrictions, to S. This lowers the wage in the female-dominated
occupation from WF* to WF and increases the number employed
there from F* to F.
The proper remedy should restore wages and the allocation of
labor in the economy to that which would exist were there no re-
strictions on entry. In the context of Figure 1, the goal is to raise
wages from WF to WF* in the female-dominated occupation and
reduce employment there from F to F*. Similarly, the goal is to
lower wages from WM to WM* in the male-dominated occupation
and to raise employment there from M to M*. If the barriers to
entry were eliminated, the only wage differentials that would per-
sist are those that resulted from choice and, as discussed above,
would thus be compensatory.
Does the remedy of comparable worth, which raises the wage
of females to that of males in "comparable" occupations, accom-
plish this result? Clearly not. The goal should be to raise wages in
the female-dominated occupation from WF to WF* and decrease
the level of employment there from F to F*. Comparable worth, by
contrast, raises wages in the female-dominated occupation from
WF to WM, not from WF to WF* as is desired. WM may be above
or below WF* depending on the elasticities of demand in the two
occupations. Only in the rarest of circumstances would the "appro-
priate" wage for females be achieved by this approach. A corollary
is that only under the rarest of circumstances will the desired re-
duction of employment from F to F* be achieved in the female-
dominated occupation.
Significantly, the reduction of employment in the female-
dominated occupation under comparable worth is not caused by an
exit of women into the male-dominated occupation increasing em-
ployment there from M to M*. This is because comparable worth
does nothing to eliminate the barrier to entry in the male-domi-
nated occupation. Thus wages in the male-dominated occupation
do not decrease from WM to WM* and employment does not ex-
pand there from M to M*. -The decline in the level of employment
in the female-dominated occupation without a corresponding in-
crease in the level of employment in the male-dominated occupa-
tion means that previously employed females will now be unem-
ployed. What comparable worth does, in effect, is attack one
inefficiency (barriers to entry in the male-dominated occupation)
by creating a second inefficiency (a minimum wage in the female-
dominated occupation). This is analogous to attacking a cartel of
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oil producers (which results in an increase in the price of coal as
consumers shift to substitute energy sources) by requiring coal
producers to lower their prices.
Comparable worth also operates as a penalty against blameless
employers. Neither employers in female-dominated occupations
nor our analogous coal producers (unlike employers in male-
dominated occupations or .oil producers) have engaged in any con-
duct that should be deterred. Both have acted as pure price-takers
by setting wages (or prices) at the competitive level, given the mar-
ket distortion over which they have no control. Indeed, both have
mitigated the plight of workers (consumers) caused by others: the
employers in the female-dominated occupation by hiring women
excluded from other occupations by discriminating employers or
unions rather than excluding them as well; the coal producers by
expanding production to provide a substitute source of energy.
Subjecting them to legal sanction for behaving in a socially desira-
ble way will eliminate their incentive to employ more women or
produce more coal. Yet this is precisely the effect of comparable
worth; it illustrates why creating a minimum wage is inferior to
attacking the source of discrimination directly.
It is also important to recognize that the creation of this mini-
mum wage will only make the underlying problem worse. Wage dif-
ferentials under the discrimination hypothesis exist because too
many women want to enter the female-dominated occupation. The
correct solution is to induce some women to exit. Comparable
worth has the opposite effect. By raising wages in the female-domi-
nated occupation, comparable worth causes more women (and
men) to enter, not less, and at the same time shrinks the number
of places available by driving down demand.
B. The State as the Employer in Both the Male-Dominated and
Female-Dominated Occupations
The situation is somewhat more complicated when, as fre-
quently will be the case, the state is the employer in both the
male-dominated and female-dominated occupations. An argument
could be made that by raising the cost of labor to the state in the
female-dominated occupation, the state will be less likely to engage
in discrimination in the male-dominated occupation. Attacking the
barrier to entry directly, however, is superior to this indirect
approach.
The difficulty with the indirect approach is that there is no
guarantee that raising the cost of labor to the state in the female-
dominated occupation will eliminate the discriminatory entry bar-
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rier. The reason is that the incidence of the increased labor costs is
indeterminate. The state may simply hire fewer women; alterna-
tively, it may pass on the increased costs to consumers and taxpay-
ers through higher prices or higher taxes. Another alternative is for
the state to divest itself of one of the two occupations-i.e., get out
of the health care business and thereby not hire nurses.3' Under
any of these alternatives, some groups are worse off (women, con-
sumers, or taxpayers) while barriers to entry in the male-
dominated occupation are unaffected. Only by attacking the entry
barriers directly can it be guaranteed that discriminating employ-
ers will be forced to end their discriminatory practices and that
women will be able to enter male-dominated occupations.
C. Societal Discrimination as the Barrier to Entry
Some argue that the source of discrimination against women is
not employers or unions but society as a whole. This societal dis-
crimination, it is claimed, manifests itself in different ways. Young
girls are encouraged to play with dolls while boys play with chem-
istry sets. Girls are socialized to become full-time wives and
mothers and to believe that traits needed for career success are not
feminine while boys are socialized to pursue a career and not share
the burdens of child rearing and household duties. Because of
these and other forms of societal discrimination, the argument
runs, women systematically choose low status and low-paying occu-
pations. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that more
women would choose to enter male-dominated occupations in the
absence of societal discrimination than do at present.
Consistent with our approach throughout, we make no at-
tempt to evaluate the merits of the claim that wage differentials
result from societal discrimination. Rather, we assume for purposes
of argument that the claim is true and demonstrate that compara-
ble worth is still the wrong remedy.
Suppose that societal discrimination has prevented women
from acquiring the skills or the desire to enter the higher-paying
male-dominated occupations. Comparable worth is still an inap-
propriate remedy for a number of reasons. First, it does nothing to
correct the initial problem. Women will continue to lack the skills
needed for male-dominated occupations, perhaps even more so be-
31 If comparable worth is interpreted to mean that occupations that have the same
value to a particular employer (rather than to society as a whole) must be paid the same,
states can avoid being challenged by providing governmental services only in occupations
that are "non-comparable."
1986]
HeinOnline  -- 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 905 1986
The University of Chicago Law Review
cause the higher wages of the female-dominated occupations make
acquiring male skills less attractive. Second, women who are by hy-
pothesis already victims of societal discrimination will be victim-
ized further by comparable worth. Recall that societal discrimina-
tion, like other forms of entry barriers, causes too many women to
want to enter female-dominated occupations. Comparable worth
does not alter the societal discrimination that creates this over-
supply of women into certain occupations. It just makes it more
difficult for women, given the existence of societal discrimination,
to act on their preferences because there will now be greater com-
petition for fewer positions available in female-dominated occupa-
tions. Third, since society as a whole is to blame, particular em-
ployers should not be subject to legal sanction. It makes no sense
to force the particular employers who hire the most women to suf-
fer the greatest costs for actions taken by society as a whole.2
In the final analysis, therefore, barriers to entry caused by so-
cietal discrimination are no different from barriers to entry caused
by the refusal of particular employers or unions to hire qualified
women. Whatever the form of barrier to entry, the proper solution
is to attack it directly rather than impose comparable worth.
IV. THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR COMPARABLE WORTH
Comparable worth is frequently defended on moral grounds.
One common claim is that the goal of pay equity for women com-
pels comparable worth. The negative implication of such a claim,
of course, is that only those in favor of inequitable treatment of
women would oppose comparable worth.
Attempting to seize the moral high ground as a form of argu-
ment is a well-known and frequently effective rhetorical device. In
the case of comparable worth, however, the moral claim is ex-
tremely dubious. The moral claim is obviously weakest if wage dif-
ferentials are a function of choice rather than crowding. In this
event, women (like men) only enter certain occupations if they per-
ceive they are made better off by doing so. Under this scenario,
wage differentials between nursing and electronics are no more "in-
equitable" than differentials among other occupations.
The moral claim for comparable worth is weak even if we as-
sume that wage differentials are the product of discrimination
against women. No connection exists in comparable worth cases
between the party being penalized and the party who engaged in
32 See supra section A of Part III.
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wrongful discrimination. In addition, the correlation between the
victims of discrimination and the beneficiaries of comparable
worth is imperfect at best. If a consensus exists that some compen-
sation should be paid to victims of past discrimination, direct fi-
nancial transfers from general revenues are superior to comparable
worth. We expand on these points below and end the section with
a brief discussion of an alternative interpretation of comparable
worth which attempts to explain its support on non-moral grounds.
A. The Effects of Comparable Worth on Various Groups
1. Women in Female-Dominated Occupations. Comparable
worth does nothing about barriers to entry in male-dominated oc-
cupations; women who want to enter those occupations are still
prevented from doing so. Wages for women remaining in female-
dominated occupations will rise to a level that, as we have dis-
cussed above, may or may not be higher than what it would be if
the barrier to entry were eliminated. This will be of particular ben-
efit to younger women who have long futures in the work force.
Older women (who have been in the labor market longer and thus
probably have been discriminated against the most) get the higher
wage for a lesser number of years.
Comparable worth will also hurt some women. As wages are
forced up in the female-dominated occupation, the supply of work-
ers (both men and women) wanting to enter that occupation will
increase. At the same time, however, the increased cost of labor
will in all probability cause fewer workers to be employed. This
greater competition for fewer positions may result in some workers,
primarily women (but also men"3), being fired and fewer being
hired in the future. Marginal workers, such as the relatively un-
skilled, the young, minorities, and middle-aged women who have
recently re-entered the workforce will in all probability be the big-
gest losers. And since comparable worth does nothing about elimi-
nating barriers to entry in male-dominated occupations, there is no
place for these women to go. They will be unemployed. Thus, one
important (and inequitable) consequence of comparable worth is
that it creates intra-occupational inequality among workers where
none existed before in an attempt to remedy inter-occupational
33 The case of male employees in female-dominated occupations is slightly different.
These employees are there by choice so they are not directly affected by barriers to entry.
While some men will benefit from the wage increase resulting from comparable worth, some
men will also be hurt. As wages rise and the level of employment in the female-dominated
occupation is reduced, some men previously employed in that field will be unemployed.
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inequality.
2. Women Who Are Not in the Work Force. Some women
have never entered the work force. One possible reason is that
these women value remaining at home more than working and
would remain at home even if there were no discrimination against
women. A second possibility is that they wanted to enter a male-
dominated occupation but were unable to do so. These women are
not helped by comparable worth because barriers to entry
remain.3 4
Still another possibility is that these women wanted to enter
the female-dominated occupation but only at higher wages. Com-
parable worth will cause some of these women to want to enter the
female-dominated occupation. The problem, however, is that com-
parable worth probably will also result in a reduction of the num-
ber of jobs available. Since women who have not entered the work
force will in all likelihood not have invested heavily in the develop-
ment of their- human capital, their prospects of entering the fe-
male-dominated occupation given the reduction in the number of
positions available will not be great. Thus this category of women
will not benefit significantly from comparable worth.
3. Employers. Employers in female-dominated occupations
are penalized by comparable worth even though they have engaged
in no discrimination. Conversely, employers who have created bar-
riers to entry by discriminating against women are unaffected by
comparable worth. In fact, comparable worth may well benefit dis-
criminating employers. The reason is that comparable worth raises
the labor cost of those who discriminate least relative to the cost of
those who discriminate most. The most discrimiinatory firms do
not hire women. By contrast, the least discriminatory firms hire
the greatest number of women. Thus these nondiscriminatory
firms suffer the largest increase in average wages from comparable
worth policies. Discriminating employers who do not hire women
in any event are less affected.
34 The harm these women suffer is necessarily less than that suffered by women who
work in female-dominated occupations. A woman who stays out of the labor force reveals
implicitly that she values staying at home more than her potential earnings in the female-
dominated occupation. The harm suffered by these women is the difference between what
their wage would have been in the male-dominated occupation absent discrimination and
the value of staying at home. The loss to women who work in the female-dominated occupa-
tion is the difference between what the wage would have been in the male-dominated occu-
pation absent discrimination and the current wage in the female-dominated occupation.
Since the wage in the female-dominated occupation is necessarily lower than the value of
home time for those who chose to stay home, the harm suffered by working women is
greater.
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As discussed above, the analysis is unaffected if the state is
the employer in both the male-dominated and female-dominated
occupations. The state has engaged in no wrongful conduct in its
capacity as an employer in the female-dominated occupation. It
should be punished, if at all, because of its discriminatory practices
in male-dominated occupations. Yet comparable worth focuses on
the level of wages paid by the state in the female-dominated occu-
pation without regard to whether the state has discriminated in
the male-dominated occupation.
B. Direct Transfers from General Revenues as an Alternative to
Comparable Worth
In arguing that the moral claim for comparable worth is not
compelling, we do not reject the possibility that women, perhaps
because of past (and possibly present) societal discrimination, are
deserving beneficiaries of wealth transfers. We express no opinion
here on the moral entitlement of women to compensation for al-
leged past or present societal discrimination. Rather, our point is
that even if such a moral entitlement exists, comparable worth is
the wrong solution. A preferable approach would be a direct trans-
fer to disadvantaged women from general revenues35
Direct transfers avoid the inefficiencies created by comparable
worth. They do not distort the relative wages among occupations
that give market participants information about the supply and
demand for particular skills. Nor do they penalize employers for
engaging in socially desirable conduct. Finally, direct transfers do
not give employers perverse incentives to create firms which only
employ workers in one occupation notwithstanding possible cost
increases.
Direct transfers are also more equitable. The costs of remedy-
ing discrimination are borne by society as a whole rather than by
blameless employers. In addition, victims of discrimination benefit
more from direct transfers than from comparable worth in a num-
ber of different ways. First, those women who have been prevented
by societal discrimination from obtaining certain skills would be
compensated under a system of direct transfers. Those women are
implicitly penalized by comparable worth since they lack the skills
that are "comparable" to those in higher-paying occupa-
tions-skills that they would have possessed had they not been
3' Such transfers could take a variety of forms ranging from direct monetary payments
to subsidies for training or education.
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victims of societal discrimination. Second, direct transfers could al-
low those who have been hurt the most-older women-to receive
the greatest benefits. Comparable worth, by contrast, provides the
greatest benefits to younger workers (those who keep their jobs)
even though they have been hurt the least by past discrimination.
Finally, direct transfers avoid the unemployment which dispropor-
tionately burdens the relatively unskilled and other weaker seg-
ments of society.
We do not suggest that implementing a direct transfer system
would be easy. Identifying victims and determining how much
compensation to pay would be difficult. Moreover, it seems inevita-
ble that the fit between those who have been discriminated against
and those who recover would be very imperfect. A transfer to all
women, for example, would provide a windfall to some women who
would have chosen to specialize in household services in any event.
But these problems also exist with comparable worth. Indeed, as
we have emphasized, comparable worth either hurts or provides
small benefits to those who are most likely to have been victims of
discrimination (older women and the relatively unskilled) while
providing the greatest benefits to those who have been discrimi-
nated against the least if at all (younger skilled women). To the
extent that these problems make both a direct transfer system and
comparable worth relatively unattractive vehicles, the better
course may be to limit recovery to those who can prove, under the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII, that they were victims of discrimina-
tion by particular employers or entities. We discuss this alternative
in Part V below.
C. An Alternative Explanation of Comparable Worth
While comparable worth is frequently defended on moral
grounds, it is possible to analyze the doctrine from an entirely dif-
ferent perspective. Comparable worth can be analyzed as a conven-
tional example of special interest regulation whereby a well organ-
ized group (workers represented by unions) attempts to use the
courts or the political process to extract wealth from larger, more
diffuse groups (i.e., taxpayers).3 6
Interpreting comparable worth as a garden variety form of
special interest regulation helps explain comparable worth's strong
" For general discussions of the special interest theory of regulation, see Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCL 3 (1971), reprinted in GEORGE
STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: EssAYs ON REGULATION 114 (1975).
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support among unions.3 7 Comparable worth, like minimum wage
laws, makes it more costly for employers to substitute relatively
unskilled workers for those who are more skilled because the rela-
tive prices of the two groups narrows.38 Because employers are less
able to employ lower-priced labor, unions have greater ability to
cartelize workers.39
The special interest theory also explains why attempts to im-
plement comparable worth have focused on the public sector. Gov-
ernments are less responsive to competitive pressures than most
private firms and can pass the costs of higher wages on to taxpay-
ers. If the full costs of wage increases can be passed on to taxpay-
ers, the pre-comparable worth level of employment can be main-
tained. In this event, intra-occupational inequality is avoided and
comparable worth becomes a pure wealth transfer from taxpayers
to workers cloaked in the rhetoric of remedying discrimination.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPARABLE WORTH, TITLE VII,
AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT
Comparable worth is frequently characterized as an extension
of existing anti-discrimination legislation such as Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. This characterization is quite misleading, however,
because comparable worth requires no showing of discrimination.
Indeed it is a given in comparable worth cases that the employer in
the female-dominated occupation has not discriminated; the em-
ployer has treated men and women in the female-dominated occu-
pation alike. The allegation is that the employer in the female-
dominated occupation pays both men and women wages that are
too "low" according to some index.
This fundamental difference between comparable worth and
existing anti-discrimination legislation suggests that Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act may be the wrong benchmarks from which to
analyze comparable worth. In this section, we demonstrate that the
rationale for anti-discrimination legislation provides no support for
31 See, e.g., BNA, supra note 7, at 73-78 (discussing union activities in support of com-
parable worth); Hearing, supra note 10, at 136-42 (statement of Brian Turner, Director of
Legislation and Economic Policy, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO).
35 On minimum wage laws, see, for example, Brozen, The Effect of Statutory Mini-
mum Wage Increases on Teen-Age Employment, 12 J.L. & ECON. 109 (1969); Linneman,
The Economic Impacts of Minimum Wage Laws: A New Look at an Old Question, 90 J.
POL. ECON. 443 (1982); Mincer, Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wage Laws, 84 J. POL.
EcoN. S87 (1976).
31 On the cartelizing effect of unions, and of labor law in general, see Posner, Some
Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 988 (1984).
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comparable worth. In addition, we suggest that in practice enforce-
ment of anti-discrimination legislation may have many of the same
perverse effects as comparable worth.
A. The Rationale of Anti-Discrimination Legislation
Discrimination against women (or minorities) can occur for a
variety of reasons. First, employers with a taste for discrimination
may simply refuse to hire qualified women or may pay them less
than equally qualified men. Second, employers who lack a taste for
discrimination may still discriminate against women because they
wrongly believe that women are incapable of doing a particular job.
Finally, employers who themselves lack a taste for discrimination
may nevertheless discriminate against women if other groups such
as workers or consumers demand discrimination. If such workers
or consumers are willing to accept lower wages or higher prices to
indulge their taste for discrimination, the profit-maximizing strat-
egy for employers may be to discriminate.
Economic self-interest acts as a check on discrimination
against women whatever its cause. The employer who refuses to
hire qualified women because of a taste for discrimination, for ex-
ample, will be at a competitive disadvantage relative to non-
discriminating employers who will pay less for labor. Similarly, the
employer who refuses to hire qualified women out of ignorance will
be at a competitive disadvantage relative to better-informed em-
ployers. Finally, the economic self-interest of workers and consum-
ers in receiving higher wages and paying lower prices also mini-
mizes the amount of discrimination.40
That economic self-interest acts as a check on discrimination
is not to suggest that discrimination against women does not ex-
ist.41 Anti-discrimination legislation such as Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act is premised on the assumption that market pres-
sures do not eliminate discrimination.42 Because these statutes
40 This assumes the workers and/or consumers bear the cost of their taste for discrimi-
nation. Alternatively, employers may be forced to bear all or part of the costs. In this event,
the economic self-interest of the employer acts as a check on discrimination by others. The
employer can, for example, refuse to hire workers with a taste for discrimination unless
those workers are willing to bear the full costs.
41 It does suggest, however, that there will be an inverse correlation between the extent
of competition in a particular market and the amount of invidious discrimination. Thus,
invidious discrimination is more likely to occur in regulated industries than in competitive
industries.
42 The existence of discrimination is not sufficient to justify the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII. It is also necessary that the social costs of discrimination exceed the social costs of
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make it unlawful for employers to refuse to hire women on the ba-
sis of sex (with certain narrow exceptions) or to pay women lower
wages for identical work, the costs to employers of indulging their
taste for discrimination or of being ignorant are increased. The ef-
fect is to eliminate, or at least reduce, barriers to entry and other
forms of discrimination in the economy. The wealth of society as
well as the wealth (although not the utility) of discriminating em-
ployers will thereby be increased. The corollary is that any remain-
ing wage differentials will then be the products of choice, not
crowding. Returning to Figure 1, enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws will have the desired effect, at least in theory,
of raising wages in the female-dominated occupation from WF to
WF* and reducing employment there from F to F* while lowering
wages in the male-dominated occupation from WM to WM* and
raising employment there from M to M*.
Comparable worth does not extend existing anti-discrimina-
tion legislation by creating a more effective weapon against entry
barriers. On the contrary, comparable worth, as we have empha-
sized, does nothing about entry barriers but instead purports to
attack one inefficiency by creating a second. Thus output in the
female-dominated occupation is reduced and the wealth of society
is decreased. As such, comparable worth is better understood as
fundamentally inconsistent with, rather than an extension of, ex-
isting anti-discrimination legislation.
B. Non-Invidious Discrimination
Thus far we have been assuming that all discrimination is in-
vidious discrimination-discrimination based on sex without re-
gard to ability, productivity, effort, and so forth. This form of dis-
crimination reduces wealth as it causes employers to pay more for
labor than they would if they did not have a taste for discrimina-
tion. Application of anti-discrimination laws to this category of
employers will have the seemingly paradoxical result of decreasing
their utility while increasing their wealth.
Now suppose a particular employer with no bias against
women can only make a profit if employee turnover is low. As a
result, he prefers not to hire individuals with characteristics that
are associated with a high level of turnover. When he does hire
these individuals, he pays them less. One such group of individuals
is women of child-bearing age. Let us further suppose that this
the legislation (enforcement costs, error costs, etc.).
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combination of sex and age is the lowest cost predictor of turnover
for this particular employer.
Even though the employer in this example has no bias against
women, it is certain that the employer who followed such employ-
ment practices would violate Title VII and/or the Equal Pay Act.43
Application of anti-discrimination legislation against this type of
employer reduces wealth; it will cause the employer to pay more
for labor than he otherwise would. To avoid this effect, the em-
ployer has incentives to find subtle ways to employ fewer women
or perhaps substitute capital for labor.
The perverse effects of anti-discrimination laws illustrated by
this example can easily be generalized. Anti-discrimination laws,
for example, may make it more difficult for members of disadvan-
taged groups who may have been victims of societal discrimination
to compete with members of advantaged groups. If members of
disadvantaged groups have fewer skills or are in general less well
trained, their value to bias-free employers will be correspondingly
less, at least until the gap in skills and training is eliminated. Strict
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, however, prevents em-
ployers from hiring members of disadvantaged groups at their mar-
ket wage. Those employees who are hired at the higher wage level
will be better off but others who would have been hired at lower
wages will be hurt. Application of anti-discrimination laws, in
short, can result in precisely the same type of intra-group inequal-
ity as minimum wage laws or comparable worth. All force employ-
ers to pay more for labor than competitive forces require and thus
may have perverse effects.
But there is an argument that can be made in support of Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act, even as applied to cases of non-
invidious discrimination. In many instances, it will be difficult to
distinguish the situation where a particular employer pays men
and women differently because of a taste for discrimination and
the situation where sex is the lowest cost predictor of another char-
acteristic that is itself non-discriminatory (e.g., turnover). If invidi-
ous discrimination is sufficiently common, and if the costs of dis-
tinguishing it from non-invidious discrimination are sufficiently
high, it may make sense to apply anti-discrimination legislation to
all employers who base decisions on sex whatever the reason.
The same argument, however, cannot be made for comparable
43 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978) (use of sex-based actuarial tables in determining pension contributions violates Title
VII notwithstanding differences in life expectancy between men and women).
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worth. No issue exists as to whether the employer of the female-
dominated occupation is paying wages at a given level because of a
taste for discrimination. By definition, the employer is paying and
otherwise treating all men and women in the female-dominated oc-
cupation the same. If not, the employer would be liable under Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act. The only issue in comparable worth
cases is whether the wages of the whole occupation should be
raised to the level of wages in "comparable" male-dominated occu-
pations. Thus the justification for prohibiting some forms of non-
invidious discrimination-the inability to distinguish non-
invidious from invidious discrimination-is completely absent as a
justification for comparable worth.
VI. COMPARABLE WORTH IN THE COURTS
Our analysis has important implications for the proper resolu-
tion of comparable worth claims. We discuss these implications
below.
A. The Importance of Entry Barriers Created by Particular
Employers or Unions
Comparable worth suits have typically been brought under Ti-
tle VII on behalf of state employees in occupations that are female
dominated; that is, occupations where at least roughly seventy per-
cent of employees are women."" The claim is that the state com-
pensates employees in these occupations at lower levels than it
compensates employees in other occupations where males domi-
nate even though the occupations have been identified by certain
wage studies to be comparable. The relief requested is to raise the
wages of employees in female-dominated occupations to the level
of wages in comparable male-dominated occupations.
Such cases can be exceptionally complex. In addition to mas-
sive amounts of evidence on the particular state's occupational cat-
egories, salary structure, and male-female participation ratios,
there will be the inevitable conflict among exp~rts concerning the
comparability of various male-dominated and female-dominated
occupations. The result can be lengthy and costly proceedings tak-
ing years to resolve.
Our approach is far simpler. The first and most important
question is whether there is any allegation that women have been
denied access to male-dominated occupations. If not, it is reasona-
4 See, e.g., AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ble to conclude that wage differentials are attributable to choice,
not discrimination. 45 In this event, there is no problem to be ad-
dressed and the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim."
If an allegation is made that a state or other defendant denies
access to an occupation on the basis of sex, the claim should not be
dismissed. But there is still no need for comparable worth; refusing
to hire on the basis of sex or paying lower wages for equivalent
work is already actionable under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
The proper defendant in such an action is the discriminating em-
ployer; the proper plaintiffs are those that have been discriminated
against. Employees who receive lower wages in female-dominated
occupations as a result of crowding but who have not been discrim-
inated against in the male-dominated occupation probably should
have no remedy.47
B. County of Washington v. Gunther
We have emphasized that the critical question in analyzing
pay disparities between male-dominated and female-dominated oc-
cupations is whether barriers to entry exist in the higher-paying
occupation. A different situation is presented if women cannot
enter the higher-paying occupation because, by definition, it is ex-
clusively male. This was the situation in County of Washington v.
Gunther.45
Gunther involved a Title VII claim by women jail guards al-
leging that they were paid lower wages than male jail guards. The
evidence indicated that the male jail guards supervised more than
45 The other possibility is that wage differentials are the result of discrimination but at
the societal level. For the reasons discussed above, comparable worth is an inappropriate
remedy for societal discrimination. See supra section C of part Ill.
46 For example, in AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985), the
court stated, "[Tihe State of Washington is not charged here with barring access to particu-
lar job classifications on the basis of sex." Under our approach, the absence of an allegation
of a barrier to entry would have led to dismissal of the complaint, thus avoiding years of
costly litigation.
47 These employees are analogous to consumers who pay higher prices for coal because
of monopoly pricing in the oil industry. Cf. W. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust
Offenses, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 652, 666-68 (1983) (discussing why higher prices charged by the
competitive fringe in cartelized industry do not increase social loss under certain assump-
tions). When consumers of the competitive fringe are allowed to recover, their cause of ac-
tion is against the cartel, not the competitive fringe. Id. at 668 n.30 (discussing cases). By
analogy, workers who have not been discriminated against should have either no remedy or
a remedy against the discriminating employer. No remedy should exist against the non-
discriminating employer.
43 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
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ten times as many prisoners per guard as did the female guards
and that the female guards devoted much of their time to clerical
duties.4" Nevertheless, the Court held that the differences in work
performed did not preclude a claim of intentional sex discrimina-
tion.50 The Court appears to have been heavily influenced by plain-
tiffs' allegation that the County had commissioned a wage study
and had implemented the salary figure suggested for male guards
but not the figure for female guards.5
Gunther is a hard case because its facts are unique. In most
cases, the issue of whether wage differentials are compensatory or
discriminatory can be analyzed directly by determining whether
women are barred from the higher-paying occupation. In Gunther,
however, it is impossible to determine whether the wage differ-
ences represent compensation for increased responsibility, risk of
injury, and less pleasant working conditions because women were
excluded by law from becoming guards of male prisoners. Thus fe-
male guards could not choose to guard male prisoners even if they
were willing to accept increased risk and stress in exchange for in-
creased pay.
Because Gunther involved a clear, albeit lawful, barrier to en-
try, it should not be used as a precedent for comparable worth in
cases where no such barriers to entry exist. Thus Gunther should
have no applicability to the vast majority of cases where no lawful
barrier to entry prevents women from entering the higher-paid
occupation.
Whether Gunther is properly decided under its own facts is
debatable. If there were no wage study, it seems clear that an alle-
gation that male guards earned more than female guards would fail
given the differences between the jobs. The alternative result
would require a court to value the difference between risk and cler-
ical duties. While in principle this could be attempted by a study
of market wages of police, guards in other places, secretaries, and
so forth, the outcome of such a study is likely to be highly uncer-
tain. It is precisely these uncertainties that are avoided, or at least
minimized, by the equal work requirement of the Equal Pay Act.52
"' Id. at 165.
go The Court was careful to emphasize, however, that it was not deciding whether the
women jail guards had stated a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, let
alone established a right to recovery. Id. at 166 n.8.
Id. at 180-81.
82 But see Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1078 (1984) (arguing that comparable worth issues pervade cases under the Equal Pay
Act). For a critical reply, see M. Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination Legisla-
1986]
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The issue is whether a different result should obtain in Gun-
ther because of the presence of the wage study. We think not. To
allow the result in cases like Gunther to depend on employers'
compliance with wage surveys gives such surveys far more defer-
ence than they deserve for the reasons discussed above.53 The very
fact that the County of Washington was apparently able to hire
the desired number of men and women jail guards at the wages the
County was willing to pay suggests that the problem in Gunther
was the quality of the survey, not the wage differential. Moreover,
to the extent wage studies have value, increasing the legal exposure
of employers who commission such studies will simply discourage
their use. Thus Gunther, in addition to having limited applicabil-
ity to other cases, is probably wrongly decided on its own facts.
CONCLUSION
Wage differentials among occupations can result from choice
or from discrimination. In neither case is comparable worth the
proper remedy. It has none of the appropriate incentive effects and
fails to provide compensation for past wrongs to the appropriate
parties. If a social consensus exists that wealth redistribution is de-
sirable, it would be more efficient and more equitable to effectuate
a direct transfer from general revenues.
tion: A Reply to Freed & Polsby, 51 U. CHi. L. Rav. 1112 (1984).
53 If Washington was paying too low a wage to women jail guards, there should have
been unfilled positions. Conversely, if Washington was paying too high a wage to male jail
guards, there should have been a queue for these positions. For an argument that virtually
all cases of discrimination involve paying men too high a wage rather than paying women
too low a wage, and that therefore the correct remedy is lowering men's wages, not raising
women's wages, see Lindsay & Shanor, supra note 13, at 205-17.
HeinOnline  -- 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 918 1986
